ABSTRACT The emphasis and visibility afforded analytic tradecraft in the Intelligence Community's analytic production has fluctuated throughout its existence. The explanation for this intermittent emphasis on tradecraft may lie in changes in consumer preferences and collection means, the role played by individual tradecraft advocates, and the lack of an intelligence failure matching the severity of 9/11 and the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Both failures served as a forceful reminder that while strong analytic tradecraft does not guarantee 'getting a judgment right', it increases the likelihood that the assessments produced are transparent, relevant, and rigorous.
. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and other national-level assessments represent the bulk of the declassified intelligence products reviewed for this article. Although narrow, this segment of IC production has historically been seen as the community's flagship product-Yet the emphasis and visibility afforded tradecraft in the IC's analytic production has fluctuated significantly throughout the community's existence. Early on many products included source reference citations, explicitly addressed intelligence gaps and analytic assumptions, and prominently highlighted alternative views. Later, however, many of these same tradecraft elements appeared less frequently in finished intelligence products. Similarly, initiatives aimed at improving analytic tradecraft -such as the establishment of the journal Studies in Intelligence, a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) product evaluation review group, and the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) -mirrored the treatment afforded tradecraft in IC product lines. Decades apart, these initiatives were not easily achieved or always sustained.
This article explores three related questions. A national intelligence estimate should reflect the coordination of the best intelligence opinion, with notation of and reasons for dissent in the instances when there is not unanimity. It should be based on all available information and be prepared with full knowledge of our own plans and in the light of our own policy requirements. The estimate should be compiled and assembled centrally by an agency whose objectivity and disinterestedness are not open to question. Its ultimate approval should line and as embodying its best analysis. Because the picture presented by declassified NIEs and other national-level products of how tradecraft was used in past assessments may be skewed, interviews with former intelligence analysts and tradecraft specialists were used to supplement and -in some cases -adjust what was discovered by examining declassified intelligence products and memoranda. 3 The passage of IRTPA and the creation of the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2005 have spurred renewed scholarly interest in the IC's use of analytic tradecraft. However, most of this literature has focused on the increased importance placed on analytic tradecraft in the wake of the IRTPA and the overall impact of the ODNI on the quality of analysis in the IC. rest upon the collective judgment of the highest officials in the various intelligence agencies. Finally, it should command recognition and respect throughout the Government as the best available and presumably the most authoritative intelligence estimate.
[Emphases added]
As highlighted in the 1950 remarks by the Director of Central Intelligence above, IC founders clearly recognized the need to produce objective, relevant, and authoritative analysis that exploited all available information and acknowledged alternative views. Elements of the current IC analytic tradecraft standards (see Figure 1 ) are prominent in the Community's early analytic efforts.
Standard 1 (Describes Quality, Reliability of Sources)
Multiple intelligence products contained the equivalent of what the IC today calls 'source summary statements'. These statements described in general terms the types of information that were used to develop the assessment as well as factors that affected the quality of the information, such as source access, reliability, and currency. For example, a 1957 National Intelligence Survey (NIS) effectively communicated the type of information used in the assessment and its perceived reliability, and it highlighted information gaps and areas requiring increased collection:
The major sources of information are reports by official U.S. observers. The information is considered to be reliable and accurate. Detailed information is lacking on the activities of the Supreme Defense Council and the Defense Council. Current information is lacking on the quantity and adequacy of supplies on hand and reserves of naval ammunition, spare parts, and fuel oil. Additional collection efforts will be required to keep information up to date as the Iraqi military establishment continues to progress with materiel received through the U.S. Military Aid Program.
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Other products produced in the 1950s used a 'Sources and Methods' or 'Sources of Information' section or paragraph to address the overall quality and composition of the sources used. 6 In some instances, these reports contained appendices that provided detailed assessments of source access and reliability.
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Source reference citations and source descriptors -both called for in ICD 206 (Sourcing Requirements for Disseminated Analytic Products) -were present in the past as well.
8 Source descriptors -for example, according to a source with direct access -were used just as today to convey the quality of underlying sourcing. And source reference citations, while not included in disseminated NIEs, were employed in products produced by the CIA and other IC organizations. These reference citations
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) mandated that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) assign an entity the responsibility of ensuring that Intelligence Community finished intelligence products are: timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based on all sources of available intelligence, and employ the standards of proper analytic tradecraft.
The law further charged the individual or entity with performing detailed reviews of IC finished intelligence products to ensure that the analytic methodologies, tradecraft, and practices used in IC analytic products met the standards stated above and to assess whether those products:
1 7 Typically these 'Sources and Evaluation of Sources' appendices would describe the sources used and identify which were most important to the assessment. In addition, many source references included a two digit source evaluation codes (letters A -F assessing reliability and a number from 1 to 6 identifying whether the information had been confirmed by other sources (1) or could not be judged (6) Analytic uncertainty -the confidence in a judgment and the likelihood that it will come to pass -was addressed in multiple ways. Intelligence gaps were treated explicitly, either through a dedicated annex or within the narrative itself. 10 IC reports in the 1950s contained 'Gaps in Intelligence' and 'Gaps and Uncertainties' sections to identify and express analytic uncertainties. 11 These annexes typically identified the areas or issues where information was lacking. Some annexes even prioritized the gaps, highlighting how the limited intelligence affected the analysis, such as in this example:
The three major gaps in intelligence on food balances in the Sino-Soviet Bloc concern state food reserves, trade, and animal feed. One of the most serious gaps is the lack of information on annual additions to, or releases from the state food reserves, and on total quantities of food stored. These statistics are significant in determining the total supply of a commodity available for consumption and in evaluating the intentions and capabilities of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. 12 Complementing these efforts was a comprehensive initiative launched by the Office of National Estimates (ONE) to examine IC knowledge gapscollection and analytic -associated with virtually every national intelligence estimate produced. As Sherman Kent later recalled: 'In the early 1950s we initiated an exercise -collateral to the main task of the ONE -which, however laudable, became a major pain in the neck. This was the ex post facto examination of important estimates with an idea of identifying the most significant gaps in our knowledge'. 13 Generically referred to as 'postmortems', these assessments began in July 1952 with a Statement of Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in Special Estimate (SE-27).
14 Analytic uncertainty also was assessed and communicated through the use of words of estimative probability. Probably, likely, unlikely, and a combination of conditional phrases and caveats were used by the IC -just as today -to communicate an assessment of the confidence associated with analytic judgments. Other conventions -such as bettor's odds -were used as well. A 1957 NIE on 'Probable Developments in Brazil', for example, concluded that the chances of a successful coup in that country 'would be less than even'.
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Standard 3 (Distinguishes between Underlying Intelligence and Analysts' Assumptions, Judgments)
Assumptions were often identified at the start in these early assessments. Estimates, such as a 1951 Special Estimate on 'Soviet Capabilities for a Surprise Attack on the Continental United States Before July 1952' did so in order to make clear the dependencies of the subsequent analysis. 16 Beyond the transparency provided, acknowledging key assumptions in estimates laid the groundwork for alternative analysis. A textbook example of this is found in a 1948 estimate addressing Soviet intentions toward Western Europe and the Near East. It states: 'In addition to the assumptions enumerated above, the basic problem of analyzing the Soviet position following the occupation of the areas in question must be considered under two broad alternative assumptions'. 17 The importance of identifying and addressing analytic assumptions was reinforced several years later when the Intelligence Advisory 13 Center for the Study of Intelligence, Sherman Kent and the Board of Estimates: Collected Essays, II, The Making of an NIE (1994) p.25, ,https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-thestudy-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-boardof-national-estimates-collected-essays/toc.html . (accessed 24 February 2012). 14 This document can be found via the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST). CREST is available at , http://www.foia.cia.gov/search_archive.asp . . However, many documents are not available online and must be viewed at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) II in College Park, MD. Documents located in the CREST database are henceforth referenced as CREST, NARA II, Agency Action Identifier, followed by the box, folder, and document number. 'Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in SE-27', 13 August 1952, CREST CIA-RDP80R01731R002600030001-4. For multiple postmortems, see 'Postmortems and Memoranda', CREST, CIA-RDP85S00362R00050000300001-2. The completion of 'postmortems' may explain in part why 'intelligence gaps' were not treated more extensively in the body or annexes of NIEs during this time. 15 Committee (IAC) -the equivalent of today's National Intelligence Boardagreed that in producing a national estimate, 'a frame of reference and the assumptions on which the estimate is based will be discussed and approved' by the committee. 18 Beyond the treatment afforded assumptions, verbs of opinion -judge, assess, believe, estimate -were used regularly in NIEs and other national-level intelligence products to effectively distinguish judgments from the underlying sourcing.
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Standard 4 (Incorporate Alternative Analysis where Appropriate)
The need to incorporate alternative analysis where appropriate in the community's products was recognized early. The DCI's 1950 comment to the IAC that 'a national intelligence estimate should reflect the coordination of the best intelligence opinion, with notation of and reasons for dissent in the instances when there is not unanimity' did not go unheeded. Analytic dissent -largely communicated through agency or organizational footnotes in NIEs -appeared frequently during the 1950s and to a lesser degree in the decades that followed. This dissent -although sometimes linked to bureaucratic interests -advanced alternative analysis in accord with the IC tradecraft standards published in 2007 as evidenced in an Air Force 'footnote' in a 1957 NIE: 'The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence has found no specific evidence or indicators from which the Soviets could derive the opinion that US caution will increase as Soviet nuclear capabilities grow. In fact, a convincing case could be made for increasing Soviet caution, based on fear that the West would feel compelled to exercise its superior military capabilities before the Soviets reverse the comparative military advantage'. identified the intelligence question being addressed. 21 That relevance and usefulness were seen as critical is not surprising. Retired Brigadier General Washington Platt's 1957 classic Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles devotes an entire chapter to the usefulness of intelligence, arguing that usefulness is the 'sole criterion' on which intelligence should be judged.
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Sherman Kent was of the same mind. As recalled by Jack Davis, Kent felt strongly that 'analysts . . . were not paid to pursue knowledge for its own sake but rather for "the practical purpose of taking action". He [Kent] went one step further: intelligence that is ignored, for whatever reason, is "useless"'. 23 Other elements of today's tradecraft standards 5 and 6 are easily discerned in earlier assessments. Providing warning is one such element. 'Warning' became a core mission of the IC during the Cold War and was featured prominently in its products, spurred by the memory of Pearl Harbor, the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea, and the fear of potential nuclear war. 24 Useful context, discussion of the direct and long-term implications of developments for US interests, and analytic expertise also were evident in many of these early estimates.
So was solid argumentation. The IC conclusions and judgments advanced were supported by sound logic and detailed discussion sections and substantive annexes. 25 As Sherman Kent wrote in noting the goal of an analyst: 'Let things be such that if our policymaking master is to disregard our knowledge and wisdom, he will never do so because our work was inaccurate, incomplete, or patently biased'. 26 The logic and depth of the analysis indicative of many of these early estimates is evident in the 1957 NIE 'Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US'. 28 The NIE begins by identifying the analytic challenges confronted and the need for strong argumentation: 'In the absence of a high level penetration of the Soviet government, the warning of attack given by intelligence must be the end product of a process of reasoning from incomplete evidence, and it therefore represents a judgment of probability'. The NIE then goes on to discuss multiple variables and their interaction, including the circumstances in which a Soviet decision to attack is made, the volume and reliability of crisis field reporting and analysis, and the effect of Soviet deception attempts. 29 Ultimately, the NIE concludes: 'The warning actually given will depend upon the particular context of events, upon unique features of such situations including even elements of pure chance, and upon certain variables which cannot be fully anticipated or compensated for by prepared procedures'. 30 
Standard 7 (Highlighting Change or Exhibiting Consistency)
Highlighting change or exhibiting consistency in the analytic judgments advanced in IC products is visible as well during the community's first two decades. As Sherman Kent wrote in 1964: 'Indeed the estimates board members and staff chiefs start every working day with a consideration of new information that might require revision of a standing NIE'. 31 An NIE from the same year addressing the capabilities of the Soviet General Purpose Forces is indicative of such efforts, noting 'the manpower in the Soviet general purpose forces has evidently declined since 1961 and we believe it is now considerably less than previously estimated'.
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Standard 8 (Accurate Judgments, Assessments) Finally, the historical record indicates that the IC was no less concerned with the accuracy of its judgments in the 1950s than it was in the wake of 2002 Iraq WMD NIE. Sherman Kent observed: 'Few things are asked the estimator more often than "How good is your batting average?" No question could be more legitimate -and none could be harder to answer'. Yet Kent and IAC members attempted to do so, completing 'validity studies' on all NIEs. This procedure -identified in a September 1955 memorandum -directed the IAC to 'review each estimate after the lapse of an appropriate interval to determine its validity, i.e., how good the estimate was in the light of subsequent developments'. 'Validation' was to occur whenever an estimate was revised or 'at any time upon the initiative of the Board of National Estimates or at the request of any one of the IAC agencies'.
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A 'validity study' completed a year after NIE 12-57 (Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure) was published illustrates the type of judgments they contained. The study begins by acknowledging the challenges associated with assessing the validity of the NIE's judgments in the wake of the 1956 Hungarian uprising but goes on to conclude that 'three of its judgments now appear to have been somewhat inaccurate': NIE 12-57 underestimated the ability of the USSR and its Satellite regimes to restore order to the Satellite area relatively quickly and efficiently after the upheavals of October 1956 . . . The estimate also appears to have erred in suggesting that Soviet policy toward Poland would be directed toward undermining the Gomulka regime (in part through rebuilding of the pro-Soviet faction in the Polish Party) and toward restoration of a more reliable Communist regime . . . Finally, we appear to have overestimated the likely role of Communist China as a factor influencing the Soviets toward a more liberal policy in the Satellites.
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Validity studies seldom detailed the factors contributing to the NIE's errors or accuracy. 'Postmortem' studies done following the completion of the NIEs probably offered insights as to whether collection deficiencies, information gaps, or inadequate research or manning issues were to blame.
Intermittent Emphasis in the Next Four Decades
Finding tradecraft elements in earlier IC products is not surprising given the importance attributed to it by Sherman Kent and other key officials who shaped the national intelligence community in the aftermath of the Second World War and the 1947 National Security Act. However, in the decades that followed the creation of Studies in Intelligence, the emphasis and visibility afforded analytic tradecraft was intermittent at best. This is evident in the sporadic frequency with which tradecraft was visible in national intelligence products as well as in the fate of a number of tradecraft initiatives that took decades to achieve or were not sustained after their initiation. 34 'Postmortems' and Memoranda, CREST, CIA-RDP85S00362R00050000300001-2. 35 'Validity Studies List' and Validity Study of NIE 10-55 and NIE 12-57, February 1958, CREST, CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3.
Infrequent Visibility of Tradecraft in Products
Manifestations of analytic tradecraft in IC products became less frequent and more sporadic after the mid-1960s. In the 1950s CIA Provisional Intelligence Reports and the IC's National Intelligence Surveys regularly incorporated robust source citations, source summary statements, and annexes addressing intelligence gaps. This was true to a lesser degree with NIEs and other national-level products.
Declassified intelligence products from the late 1960s and 1970s contained few of the tradecraft elements prevalent during the 1950s. Sources, for example, were addressed in less detail or not at all. 36 Similarly, treatment of intelligence gaps and assumptions were noted in only one of the declassified NIEs produced during these two decades.
37 Discussion of analytic methodology, estimative challenges, and alternative analysis fared somewhat better, driven in part by the problems associated with a growing Soviet nuclear force and the Nixon administration's disdain for the IC's judgments and mistrust of its methods. 38 For example, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's staff attempted to resolve a dispute over the capabilities of the Soviet SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile by examining the intelligence evidence at length. Subsequently the intelligence community was required to use a new format for estimates on Soviet military capabilities that included 'a series of optional analyses and exhaustive displays of the evidence underlying each judgment'.
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This lack of trust also spurred calls for 'competitive analysis' and the famous 'Team B' report several years later addressing Soviet strategic objectives. attention was devoted to standards 1 and 2. At least nine NIEs, Special NIEs (SNIEs), or other IC coordinated products contained sections addressing sourcing -similar to today's source summary statement -or intelligence gaps or uncertainties. 41 For example, a 1993 NIE -'Global Humanitarian Emergencies' -featured a textbox on 'Sources of Information' that mirrored earlier holistic efforts in treating sourcing. The textbox began by noting in general terms the sources used and then went on to directly address the quality of reporting: 'These reports frequently provide conflicting information', noting 'we believe some reporters . . . at times exaggerate the gravity of a situation'.
42 Several assessments during the 1980s and 1990s used bettor's odds to convey analytic confidence or employed textboxes to identify assumptions or working premises. 43 Change or consistency in analytic judgments over time (standard 7) also was addressed in a handful of NIEs in each decade. 44 A 1990 NIE assessing the dramatic and rapid changes in the USSR was among the best of these, acknowledging that 'our previous Estimate, while foreseeing the tumult, overstated the regime's ability to contain the republics' drive for sovereignty and underestimated the challenge to Communist Party rule from new political forces'. tradecraft elements in analytic products. For example, disagreement over whether source citations should be incorporated into products not only surfaced in Studies in Intelligence in 1964 but was cited over a decade later in the DCI's publication Review of National Intelligence.
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How analytic uncertainty might be expressed is another example of the inconsistent attention afforded tradecraft. Sherman Kent -as well as others -discussed the need for and merits of expressing analytic uncertainty in a more rigorous and uniform way in articles published in 1964 in Studies in Intelligence.
47 But efforts to implement Kent's ideas were not widely pursued within the IC. One exception was an experiment the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ran almost a decade later that received its initial impulse from high-level Department of Defense consumers who repeatedly indicated dissatisfaction 'with vague language of the "it is believed . . . " or "hostilities possibly will . . . " character'. The experiment was designed 'to achieve more precise statements of the confidence and probability of intelligence judgments'.
48 After a trial period and consumer survey results, DIA decided to quantify the probability (in percentages) of all major judgments and projection in its DIN (Defense Intelligence Note) product line. 49 Yet even this commendable DIA effort did not last. 50 Nor was it pursued by others in the IC. For example, a 1983 CIA report addressing intelligence judgments preceding historical failures recommended that 'probabilities in both majority and minority cases should be quantified'. 51 Other 'On Again, Off Again' Tradecraft Initiatives
Tradecraft initiatives in different venues mirrored the 'on again, off again' incorporation of analytic tradecraft in IC products. The Board of National Estimates, for instance, launched multiple tradecraft initiatives in the mid1950s that either eventually died out or took decades to achieve. One ambitious effort -as noted above -was to assess the intelligence gaps in NIEs as part of a 'postmortem' evaluation program. Another was the attempt to assess accuracy in 'validity studies'. By the early 1960s, however, 'validity studies' had largely disappeared and postmortems evaluations became reserved for perceived 'intelligence failures', going beyond their earlier narrower focus on intelligence gaps and analytic challenges. 53 Although the workload associated with postmortems and the difficulty of judging accuracy contributed to their disappearance, the lack of support from IC seniors for their continuation probably sealed their fate. The IC effort to evaluate the quality of its finished intelligence analysis was another area marked by intermittent emphasis and a failure to sustain momentum and reach full potential. This effort was probably inspired in part by the Board of Estimate's earlier work in identifying 'intelligence deficiencies' and conducting 'postmortems' on critical intelligence analyses. However, added impetus was provided by the 1971 Schlesinger Report which called for 'entirely new organizational units . . . to evaluate the analytical and estimating activities of the community'. 58 In fact, the Schlesinger Report recommended that intelligence products be assessed 'through quality control and product evaluation sections within the production organizations themselves'. 59 Terms of reference were completed in May 1972 for a DCI-sponsored Product Review Group. 60 Two years later the Intelligence Product Review Panel began evaluating products on a trial basis as a component of the IC staff's Product Review Division (PRD). 61 Beyond evaluating IC assessments, PRD also produced a publication called the Review of National Intelligence (RONI). This publication -which was first published in February 1975 and had DCI William Colby's backing -highlighted tradecraft initiatives throughout the IC, discussed consumer satisfaction with IC products, and presented selected findings from CSI reports on tradecraft issues. 62 Although well received, the RONI ceased publication in August 1976 after only three issues. 63 Created -or at a minimum noted -at the time PRD was established were IC 'principles' that resemble the analytic standards identified three decades later in the 2004 IRPTA and codified in ICD 203. These included objectivity, independent of political considerations, and action oriented and responsive, corresponding closely to today's IC Analytic Standards A through C. The fourth principle was acknowledging dissent, one of the analytic tradecraft elements specified in ICD 203 under Standard Eexhibits proper standards of analytic tradecraft. 64 These principles -like many IC tradecraft initiatives -had a short shelf life. Prior to 2006 no community-wide evaluation program or analytic standards had emerged. 65 By the start of the 1980s, efforts to evaluate the quality of analysis were again afoot. A CSI-sponsored workshop in April 1980 was convened to 'discuss the evaluation of intelligence products'. 66 In announcing the conference, the CSI noted the absence of a 'community-wide evaluation system'. 67 Despite the conference, an IC-wide program to evaluate intelligence products failed to materialize.
What did emerge two years later was a concerted CIA effort to create a staff to perform such a function. Chartered in 1982, the Production Evaluation Staff (PES), according to CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, had two major responsibilities: 'research planning and evaluation of our product'. 68 Helene Boatner, PES's first chief, identified some of the factors used by PES to judge the quality of analysis in a paper she delivered at the convention of the International Studies Association in March 1984:
Accuracy (on both facts and judgments) is one key ingredient. Timeliness is another -if the analysis does not arrive before the critical US decisions are made, it serves no useful purpose. Effective delivery -a clear message forced to the attention of the people who need it -is another essential. Finally, objectivity is the characteristic that separates intelligence analysis from advocacy or from catering to the policy preferences of our customers. Of these, accuracy and objectivity are the two that come in for the greatest amount of discussion. 69 Like the community's mid-1970s 'Principles', PES's evaluation criteria shared much common ground with today's IC Analytic Standards. This commonality extended beyond the evaluation criteria to the acceptance of the program itself. Nothing comparable was embraced by the larger IC until the passage of the 2004 IRTPA even though CIA's evaluation effort continued during the ensuing decades.
Tradecraft Seldom Center Stage: Understanding Why
The answer as to why analytic tradecraft appeared intermittently in the IC's products and was emphasized sporadically can be attributed to multiple factors, including changing consumer intelligence requirements and the products provided to meet them. Increasingly, products became shorter and geared toward providing current or near-term assessments. 70 Research-based assessments -which were prevalent in the IC's first decade -commanded an increasingly smaller share of the national-level analytic effort. Shorter products placed a premium on space and -just as today -made it more difficult to address some tradecraft elements. The creation of the President's Intelligence Checklist (PICL) -the forerunner of today's President's Daily Brief (PDB) -in the early 1960s was one example. Another was DCI Colby's initiative to provide consumers with a 'newspaper' a decade later. 71 This trend has not been reversed with the passage of time as evidenced in the findings of multiple independent, Congressional, and IC reviews. As the 2005 WMD Report noted: 'The Intelligence Community we have today is buried beneath an avalanche of demands for current intelligence -the pressing need to meet the tactical requirements of the day'. 72 This shift was probably driven in part by the needs of IC consumers. 'The requirements for intelligence at this national level are particularly fascinating because they are so kaleidoscopic', James P. Hanrahan wrote in a 1967 article in Studies in Intelligence. 'They change with the men, they change with the times, they change with the bureaucratic structure, they change with each policy decision'. 73 An internal CIA note responding to some of the criticisms contained in the 1971 Schlesinger Report echoed this theme, pointing to the consumer's changing desire for alternative analysis: 'One source of our present difficulties is that customer emphasis has changed in recent years. Whereas there was formerly more often a demand that the range of possibilities be narrowed and probable developments estimated, now there is more often a demand that a fuller range of possibilities be described'.
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Consumers also were confronted with greater amounts of information to digest and less time to do so. 'Short is better' has always been the perception of consumer preferences in the IC. In arguing against including source reference citations in intelligence products in 1964, Allan Evans wrote: 'The first and most important arguments are that our customers won't read fat papers and "almost certainly" in overwhelming majority don't want to be bothered with documentation'. 75 James Hanrahan put it even more bluntly: 'If we have not been asked specifically but feel it desperately important to get something across to the senior policy maker, brevity is the overriding value. Conclusion and judgments are the nub; argumentation can come later'. 76 The development of more sensitive collection means also may explain why analytic tradecraft received only intermittent attention in the ensuing decades. With the advent of satellite imagery and other technical collection means, IC analysts were confronted -some said overwhelmed -with a flood of new information. 77 Single-source intelligence took on increasing importance and analytic tradecraft became in some ways more specialized and technical. 78 These new sensitive sources also increased the importance of protecting sources and methods, forcing changes in distribution lists and product lines. Some argued that source summary statements, source reference citations and other ways to make tradecraft transparent increased the potential for leaks and damage to national security. 79 Even when the 1990-91 Gulf War forced the IC to broaden distribution to military and allied consumers while protecting sources and methods, what resulted -the policy of 'Write for Release' -championed removing all sources or blurring the insight provided into the nature and quality of the sources used. 80 The emergence of tradecraft advocates also helps to explain the periods of emphasis and the seeming lack of attention at other times. 81 During the 1980s and 1990s a small group of senior leaders recognized the need for rigorous analytic tradecraft and strongly supported initiatives and programs designed to strengthen it. Robert Gates was the most prominent and influential of these advocates. First as the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) (1982 -86), then as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence under William Casey and William Webster, and later as DCI (1991-93), Gates put tradecraft at or near the top of his agenda. As DDI, Gates personally took an intense interest in the quality of CIA's products. Gates or his deputy reviewed all products going to policy-level consumers. In addition, he established CIA's Product Evaluation Staff. 82 Gates laid out his thoughts on tradecraft in testimony before Congress and in a 1992 Studies in Intelligence article entitled 'Guarding Against Politicization'. 83 Probably inspired in part by the controversy surrounding charges raised at his Senate confirmation hearings concerning politicization during his tenure, he argued that the best defense against politicization and ensuring objectivity was strong tradecraft. 84 Gates went on to make the case for many of today's IC's Analytic Standards. He observed that 'distortion of analysis is much less likely, and much easier to spot, if there is a concerted effort at all levels to observe basic standards'. He went on to stress that 'We must make explicit what is known and clearly distinguish between fact, inference, and judgment' and emphasized the need for alternative analysis, stating: 'We should provide an outlet for different interpretations, theories, or predictions in our mainline publications, not just in a staff note or a piece at the back of the monthly'. 85 Gates supported his push for more rigorous tradecraft by urging the DDI to 'develop a DI tradecraft manual and work with the Office of Training and Education to enhance the tradecraft training that analysts receive in formal courses'. 86 He also asked the DDI to appoint a full-time ombudsman, take steps to include 'well-reasoned, relevant, and factually supported alternative views in mainline products', and 'mandate wider dissemination of studies by the Product Evaluation Staff focused on politicization and the use of alternative analysis'.
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In the mid-1990s CIA's DDI Douglas MacEachin took the tradecraft baton from Gates and pushed it forward. MacEachin made his case in 'The Tradecraft of Analysis: Challenge and Change in the CIA', a paper he presented at a meeting of the Working Group of the Consortium for Intelligence in February 1994. 88 MacEachin urged a return to the 'basics' of analysis, demanding that analysts go back to the fundamental questions of what we do, and what is the best way to do it. 89 In detailing the meaning of 'redefining our analytic tradecraft to emphasize "facts" and the "findings" derived from them', MacEachin's rationale mirrored much of today's IC analytic tradecraft standards:
This does not mean opinions are no longer valued, but it does require that their credibility be established through intelligence practices that clearly identify what is known, how it is known, and with what level of reliability; what is not known that could have important consequences; the 'drivers' or 'linchpins' that are likely to govern the outcome of dynamic situations; the analytic calculus underlying all conclusions and forecasts; and the uncertainties in any of the components of the analysis and the implications of those uncertainties for alternative outcomes. Adherence to these principles of analytic tradecraft are to be the standard of professional excellence -the 'professional ethic' -of the Directorate.
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MacEachin's thoughts were manifested in an increased emphasis on analytic tradecraft in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). 91 The Product Evaluation Staff's 1996 publication 'A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes', which contained chapters addressing one or more of the nine standards used to evaluate the tradecraft proficiency of DI assessments, was indicative of this emphasis. 92 MacEachin's efforts ultimately led to a new training course for junior analysts focused on the fundamentals of analytic 86 Ibid., p.11. 87 tradecraft. 93 In similar fashion, John McLaughlin -DDI from 1997 to 2000 -continued to press for better analytic tradecraft, with the creation of the Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis in 2000 representing the culmination of his efforts. 94 
Turning Point: Intelligence Failures in Rapid Succession
While the rise and role played by tradecraft advocates are linked to multiple factors -including budgetary constraints and the size and seniority of the analytic workforce -none may be more important than the real and perceived 'failures' by the IC. 95 Sherman Kent's advocacy for strong analytic tradecraft in the 1950s certainly garnered support from the intelligence deficiencies identified prior to but highlighted during the conflict in Korea. 96 Robert Gates' push for increased analytic rigor in the early 1980s came in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Shah's unexpected ouster in Iran. 97 His efforts a decade later -along with those of MacEachin and others -followed the demise of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union.
Ironically the absence of earlier intelligence failures matching the scale of 9/11 and its seeming repetition in Iraq two years later may be the most important factor in explaining why there has not been a more concerted and continuous emphasis on analytic tradecraft in the IC's first five decades. Although the IC was criticized for failing to provide timely warning and accurate assessments in multiple instances in the five decades since its inception -the testing of a Soviet A-bomb in 1949, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the outbreak of the 1973 Mideast War, and India's 1998 nuclear detonations to name a fewnone matched the shock and immediate loss of thousands of American lives in the 9/11 attacks and the failure to find WMD in Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 war.
The scale and temporal proximity of these failures was unprecedented in postWorld War II US history. Earlier intelligence failures did spur calls for change within the IC; virtually all the reviews and recommendations focused on organizational structure and management, not added emphasis on analytic tradecraft. 98 The 1949 Dulles and 1971 Schlesinger Reports were the only exceptions. And even here, the tradecraft initiatives generated partially in response to the studies -postmortems, validity studies, and IC-wide analytic standards and product evaluations -were not sustained or codified in IC directives or legislation.
Lessons For Today
What can we learn from the past treatment of analytic tradecraft that can aid the IC in the years ahead? A look at the IC's past use -or non-usestrengthens the case for the current IC Analytic Standards. The standards are not simply a creation of IRTPA or a knee-jerk reaction to a perceived or real intelligence failure. While not codified earlier as standards, the value of identifying sources, addressing analytic uncertainty, and defining assumptions were all clearly recognized and practiced early on and throughout much of the IC's existence. So was the need to identify alternative views and explore the implications for the United States.
The historical record highlights that endemic and still relevant problems analytic tradecraft was designed to mitigate -cognitive biases, mindsets, poor logic and hazy exposition, to name a few -still confront the community. Criticism leveled at the IC's performance in assessing the 2011 Arab Spring echo many of themes identified in internal community reviews in the aftermath of 1973 Arab -Israel War and the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. 99 According to current and former American officials, President Obama faulted the intelligence agencies over their performance in predicting and analyzing the spreading unrest in the Middle East and was 'specifically critical of intelligence agencies for misjudging how quickly the unrest in Tunisia would lead to the downfall of the country's authoritarian government'. 100 The same is true for the endemic problems identified in the 2011 National Academy of Sciences study, Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow.
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The record also shows that analytic tradecraft must evolve to provide the greatest value to intelligence analysts and IC consumers. As analysts began to rely on a greater number and variety of technical intelligence collection platforms, providing insight into the nature and quality of the underlying sourcing became more difficult. Changing consumer preferences and the ever-increasing demands on their time likewise posed new challenges on incorporating tradecraft into shorter products. How the IC assesses and uses new sources -like social media -highlight that these same challenges remain today. Clearly there is a requirement to educate intelligence producers and consumers on the necessity to tailor and employ analytic tradecraft as these new frontiers for exploitation and analysis evolve. 102 The 'analytic transformation' initiative launched in 2006 by the DNI's first Deputy Director for Intelligence Analysis was a clear acknowledgement that the IC must employ new analytic processes as well as technologies to effectively produce and disseminate its work in the future, a theme echoed in the 2011 Analyst-IC Associate Teams Program sponsored by the ODNI and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. 103 This review highlights the need for the IC to maintain its focus on analytic tradecraft and ensure it is evident in its analytic products and in its workspaces. The IC's historical record drives home the necessity for continual self-evaluation as well as vigilance to guarantee that the emphasis placed on tradecraft does not disappear or become intermittent or dependent on a single advocate. Analytic tradecraft proficiency -like knowledge of a foreign language -will be lost if not employed, recognized, and rewarded. As noted in the 2005 WMD Report: 'Our studies, and many observers, point to a decline in analytic rigor within the Intelligence Community. Analysts have suffered from weak leadership, insufficient training, and budget cutbacks that led to the loss of our best, most senior analysts. There is no quick fix for tradecraft problems'. 104 The past 50 years demonstrate that it often took intelligence failures, Congressional or administration reviews and tradecraft advocates in positions of authority to re-emphasize and ensure tradecraft received the appropriate attention and resources.
The roles played by Sherman Kent, Robert Gates, Douglas MacEachin, and others in refocusing the IC's attention on analytic tradecraft remind us that individuals can make a difference. 105 However, even with these allies not all the recommendations included in the various studies and reports were pursued or adopted. It took three decades and the events of 9/11 and the failure to find WMD in Iraq to lead to the creation of IC-wide analytic standards and the requirement for an IC organization -ODNI's Analytic Integrity and Standards Group -to report annually to Congress on the quality of the community's analysis.
Lastly, this review reminds us that the critical thinking and the rigor underlying IC analysis -the community's analytic tradecraft -remain its 'center of gravity'. IC consumers in the wake of the Iraq WMD failure have rightly demanded to see more of what lies behind analytic judgments -be it the quality of the sources used, the number and nature of intelligence gaps surrounding the issue, or the underlying assumptions. While getting a judgment 'right' is what ultimately matters most, the recipients of IC analytic products recognize that strong analytic tradecraft is more likely to result in assessments that are relevant and rigorouswhat they need and value most. Past as well as the future national security challenges confronting IC consumers suggest the need to employ strong analytic tradecraft will endure. 
